Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We consider the following stage game : a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008229
When consumers differ in their attitude towards risk, price competi- tion between products of uncertain characteristics may be analyzed using address-models of product differentiation. These models provide a natural set-up for analyzing industries in which products of different reliability may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042853
We model duopoly competition between two platforms.They operate in a two-sided market where agents are heterogeneous on both sides of the market and are allowed to mulithome. Network effects are captured within a vertical differentiation framework.Under single-homing there exists an interior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042863
We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna [89]. We show that a foreign pro- ducer would...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043096
Both product differentiation through quality and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, they have not been considered simultaneously. To this end we consider a three stage game where firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008568
We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman [83] in the address model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competition drastically. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065295
In this paper, we consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stage model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, we show that EU antidumping policy that takes the form of price-undertakings offers a powerful protection to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065378
We consider a stage-game where the entrant may simultaneously commit to its product's quality and the level of its production capacity before price competition takes place. We show that capacity limitation is more effective than quality reduction as a way to induce entry accommodation: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550174
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550175
We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550220