Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501955
We examine the relative performances of reverse auctions and request for quotes in a simple commodity environment … auctions. With respect to the general investigation of auctions, the request for quote is the mirror image of a first price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835680
In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price, she does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079307
This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric … set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price-quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650691
This paper estimates the value of superstitions by studying the auctions of vehicle license plates. We show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836244
This paper considers a two-stage game, where in the first stage, two firms bid non-cooperatively for a production technique that leads to a reduction in cost. Following the auction in the second stage of the game these firms compete against each other in a duopolistic industry. The amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109964
In reverse auctions, buyers often retain the right to bargain further concessions from the winner. The optimal form of … such procurement is an English auction followed by an auctioneer's option to engage in ultimatum bargaining with the winner …. We study behavior and performance in this procurement format using a laboratory experiment. Sellers closely follow the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112148
In a standard auction, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders increases. However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996, Games and Economic Behavior) show that when bidders have multiple-unit demand that generates positive synergies, bidders bid less aggressively as the number of bidders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789669