We review Bayesian inference for dynamic latent variable models using the data augmentation principle. We detail the diffculties of simulating dynamic latent variables in a Gibbs sampler. We propose an alternative specification of the dynamic disequilibrium model which leads to a simple...

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information, Nash-Walras equilibria...

The present note highlights the seminal contributions of Diamond, Drèze and Radner towards the integration of financial markets into general equilibrium modeling.

The paper studies equilibria for economies with imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. Following Negishi, firms maximise profits under downward-sloping perceived demand functions. Negishi's assumptions, in particular the assumption of a single monopolistic competitor in each market,...

We analyze a class of "large group" Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models using multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) and additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions. We first prove that the MQS and AQS functions are equivalent to the "constant relative risk aversion" (CRRA) and...

The critical role of free entry to correct inherent deviance behavior has been stressed by Vanek (1970), Meade (1972) amongst others. The equivalence theorem (Dreze 1976) defines that labour and entrepreneurial management both lead to the same Pareto optimal equilibrium provided that there is...

If a solution (on a closed family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independance of irrelevant strategies (IIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in...