That climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often creates major fears. But the alernative (no action) also has a cost. Mitigation costs and damages incurred depend on what the climate policies are, and in addition, they are substitutes. This brings climate policies naturally in the...

For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate equals the growth rate of real per-capita income, say 2%, thus falling right into the range suggested by the U.S. Offce of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a simple tool to evaluate small policy...

We argue that the economic evaluation of health care (cost-benefit analysis) should respect individual preferences and should incorporate distributional consid- erations. Relying on individual preferences does not imply subjective welfarism. We propose a particular non- welfarist approach, based...

The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.

This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.