Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several individuals - called tortfeasors - is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there are basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them, legal scholars are still looking for a systematic apportionment method. We...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several approximations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper...

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Moebius value associated with a o sharing system and...

This paper deals with the issue of how to allocate greenhouse gas emission permits to nations in the long run. The so-called "equitable" rules to allocate such permits under a global agreement (per capita or grandfathering allocation rules for instance) do not necessarily ensure stability in the...

We discuss the welfare effects of bundling two products offered by two symmetric firms. We first show that, in terms of welfare, a monopoly does better than a duopoly in which each firm sell its good and that a monopoly selling the bundle does better than if it sells the bundle and the two goods...

A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. In the first part, we provide an axiomatic...

We consider the problem of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements faced by standard-setting organizations. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents to be weak in the...

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...