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Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable preferences. This raises a challenge for welfare economics, which takes as a key postulate that individual preferences should be respected. We agree with Bernheim (2009) and Bernheim and Rangel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610462
We analyse participation in medical prevention with an expected utility model that is sufficiently rich to capture diverging features of different prevention procedures. We distinguish primary and secondary prevention (with one or two rounds) for both fatal or non-fatal diseases. Moreover, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695715
The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478927
This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478939
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947
In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948
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In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478962
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972