It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking contest when the contest success function parameter is greater than two. We analyze the contest using the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies, which is a generalization of the Nash...

A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against...

We study the political economy of social insurance with double heterogeneity of voters (e.e., different income and risk levels). Social insurance is financed through distortionary taxation and redistributes across income and risks. Individuals vote over the extent of social insurance, which...

We introduce a procedure that uses basic topological characteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the...

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have...

Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability...

We revisit and extend previous theoretical work on internationalization decisions by firms which are imperfectly informed on the state of the demand in the market into which they are planning to export or enter through foreign direct investment (FDI). The latter is a costly strategy mitigating...

In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...