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The [gamma]-core and coalition formation
CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043417
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Comparison of information structures
GOSSNER, Olivier - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997
Several authors have observed that in interactive decision frameworks, welfare is not monotonic with information in the sense that more information can make agents worse off. This contrasts with Blackwell’s comparison of statistical experiments in which more information can only make the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042970
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Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni; XUE, Licun - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002
If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structures they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's (1997)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008436
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Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
RAMAEKERS, Eve; KAYI, Cagatay - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008
A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency … not know agents’ waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency … that even non-single-valued rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness if and only if they select …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042819
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Generic Efficiency and Collusion-proofness in Exchange Economies.
Giraud, G.; Rochon, C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
We define a new strategic equilibrium concept -called strong collusion- proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.We then construct a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669237
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Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
NORA, Vladyslav; UNO, Hiroshi - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
This paper introduces games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real valued function on the set of action profiles such that, for one player, minimizing the function implies choosing her best-response, and, for the other players, maximizing it implies choosing their best-responses. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927700
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Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities
CALCIANO, Filippo L. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011
In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927703
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Constitutions and social networks
MAULEON, Ana; ROEHL, Nils; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927716
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Stochastic signaling: information substitutes and complements
TRUYTS, Tom - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
I develop a model of stochastic costly signaling in the presence of exogenous imperfect information, and study whether equilibrium signaling decreases ('information substitutes') or increases ('information complements') if the accuracy of exogenous information increases. A stochastic pure costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927722
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On the timing of tax and investment in fiscal competition models
Hindriks, Jean; Nishimura, Yukihiro - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
We study a model in which asymmetric regions compete for capital with both public investments and taxes. Public investments are chosen in the first stage, and then source income taxes are set in the second stage. Public investments increase the productivity of capital and they also serve to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246313