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The [gamma]-core and coalition formation

CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043417

Comparison of information structures

GOSSNER, Olivier - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997

Several authors have observed that in interactive decision frameworks, welfare is not monotonic with information in the sense that more information can make agents worse off. This contrasts with Blackwell’s comparison of statistical experiments in which more information can only make the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042970

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

RAMAEKERS, Eve; KAYI, Cagatay - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency … not know agents’ waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency … that even non-single-valued rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness if and only if they select …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042819

Coalitions, agreements and efficiency

DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni; XUE, Licun - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structures they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's (1997)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008436

Generic Efficiency and Collusion-proofness in Exchange Economies.

Giraud, G.; Rochon, C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

We define a new strategic equilibrium concept -called strong collusion- proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.We then construct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669237

Choquet Rationality.

Ghirardato, P.; Le Breton, M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478939

Two Examples of Strategic Equilibria in Approval Voting Games.

De Sinopoli, F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948

A Remark on the Number of Trading Posts in Strategic Market Games.

Koutsougeras, L.C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478962

Information Advantage and Dominant Strategies in Second-Price Auctions.

Einy, E.; Haimanko, O.; Orzach, R.; Sela, A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478966

A Remark on Voters' Rationality in Besley and Coate Model of Representative Democracy.

De Sinopoli, F.; Turrini, A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972