We consider the class of two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with incomplete information where Nash equilibria have been characterized, namely games with lack of information on one side and games with private values. We show that in these models, every Nash equilibrium payoff can...

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay...

This paper considers whether countries might mutually agree a policy of open borders, allowing free movement of workers across countries. For the countries to agree, the short run costs must outweighed by the long term benefits that result from better labor market flexibility and income...

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better...

We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem...

This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

This paper introduces games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real valued function on the set of action profiles such that, for one player, minimizing the function implies choosing her best-response, and, for the other players, maximizing it implies choosing their best-responses. We...

This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for complete information games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and from the cooperative...

A recurrent dilemma in team management is to select between a team-based and an individual based wage scheme. We explore such a dilemma in a simple model of production in teams, in which the team members may differ in their effort choices and qualification. We show that, in spite of enhancing...