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Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244

Why corrupt governments may receive more foreign aid

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

-country model of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium corruption into two components: the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550232

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278

Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria

GOERTZ, Johanna; MANIQUET, François - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2013

We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with multiple alternatives, in which voters have common interests. Voters’ preferences depend on an unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662665

Equilibrium in secure strategies

iskakov, Mikhail; ISKAKOV, Alexey - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662671

Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest

ISKAKOV, Mikhail; ISKAKOV, Alexey; ZAKHAROV, Alexey - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking contest when the contest success function parameter is greater than two. We analyze the contest using the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies, which is a generalization of the Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752806

Environmental maintenance in a dynamic model with heterogenous agents

BORISSOV, Kirill; BRECHET, Thierry; LAMBRECHT, Stéphane - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

We assume a population of infinitely-lived households of the economy split into two groups : one with a high discount factor (the patient) and one with a low one (the impatient). The environmental quality is deteriorated by firm's polluting emissions. The governmental policy consists in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610498

Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies world- wide. We show that if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836129

A theory of soft capture

AGRELL, Per; GAUTIER, Axel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

In this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three- tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836131

The political economy of derived pension rights

LEROUX, Marie - Louise; PESTIEAU, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

Derived pension rights exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly targeted towards non-working wives and widows and are viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836137