At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

The authors examine a variant of the uncapacitated lot-sizing model of Wagner-Within involving sales instead of fixed demands, and lower bounds on stocks. Two extended formulations are presented, as well as a dynamic programming algorithm and a complete description of the convex hull of solutions.

Relying on numerical methods, we estimate menus of linear contracts as proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1986) for the regulation of firms in a framework with moral hazard and adverse selection.