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Nash-Walras Equilibria of a Large Economy.
Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information, Nash-Walras equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478963
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Complementarity, coordination, and credit
FEDELE, Alessandro; MANTOVANI, Andrea - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008608
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Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution
GRECO, Luciano - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
Economic research has inquired the role of asymmetric information between central and local governments in shaping the structure of optimal regional grants. In the mainstream literature, the theoretical setting has been characterized by some basic informational asymmetry between central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065468
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Moral hazard in financial markets Inefficient equilibria and monetary policies
FEDELE, Alessandro - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
This paper presents a moral hazard model of financing in which borrowers adopt two modes of finance, either issuing bonds or applying for bank loans. The bond rate is set by the borrowers, while the loan rate is chosen by a monopolisticbank. Bank finance ameliorates the moral hazard problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043609
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Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice
GHATAK, Maithreesh; MORELLI, Massimo; SJÖSTRÖM, Tomas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997
This paper introduces a general equilibrium, overlapping generations model of the principal- agent problem. Bargaining power, occupational choice, and the returns to each occupation are endogenous. Individuals live for two periods and must work when young. When old, they have a choice between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043705
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A Simple Measure of Risk Aversion in the Large and an Application.
Chander, P. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000
We introduce a simple measure of risk aversion in the large. Besides satisfying properties which are conceptually … analogous to the usual properties of the Arrow-Pratt measure, the index of risk aversion in the large leads to a stronger … concept of decreasing risk aversion, which necessarily imp lies decreasing absolute risk aversion but not necessarily non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634228
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Economic and Social Security in the Twenty-First Century, with Attention to Europe.
Dreze, J.H. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000
A partly heuristic attempt at exploring long-run policies aimed at a second-best compromis between ex ante risk … advocated, together with imposed risk sharing between capital and labour, between generations and between countries belonging to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634224
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Stochastic signaling: information substitutes and complements
TRUYTS, Tom - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
I develop a model of stochastic costly signaling in the presence of exogenous imperfect information, and study whether equilibrium signaling decreases ('information substitutes') or increases ('information complements') if the accuracy of exogenous information increases. A stochastic pure costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927722
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Auctions with prestige motives
BOS, Olivier; TRUYTS, Tom - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
Social status, or prestige, is an important motive for buying art or collectibles and for participation in charity auctions. We study a symmetric private value auction with prestige motives, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We elicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011228297
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A theory of BOT concession contracts
AURIOL, Emmanuelle; PICARD, Pierre M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610448