We model a non-cooperative energy tax setting game amongst countries who join an international market in which firms trade emission permits. Countries can auction a share of their permit endowment and issue the remainder for free to a representative firm. Each country's regulator has a double...

Firms' or industries' ranking in terms of environmental performance may be influenced by equilibrium and not only by ex ante technological characteristics. We adopt a natural definition of relative eco-efficiency between two industries operating withinthe same environmental constraint: the more...

In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation of enterprises that exercise market power in the output market and also buy and sell pollution permits. Differently from the existing literature, using a market approach we explicitly model the interaction between the...

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past...

This paper deals with the issue of how to allocate greenhouse gas emission permits to nations in the long run. The so-called "equitable" rules to allocate such permits under a global agreement (per capita or grandfathering allocation rules for instance) do not necessarily ensure stability in the...

Tradable permits are now widely used to control pollution. We investigate the implications of setting up such a system in another area population control, either domestically or at the global level. We first generalize the framework withboth tradable procreation allowances and tradable...

International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes....

Specific supply-chain investments are vital in achieving faster lead-time performance and more competitive costs. In practice, such as in the highly leveraged telecom sector, the coordinating original equipment manufacturers (OEM) often delegate the upstream coordination of suppliers to contract...