We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetrict Nash equilibrium. We also show tha whenever an equilibrium does exisq it is unique. Closed...

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being...

We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with variable demand elasticities and investigate the impact of free trade on welfare and efficiency. First, contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are due to increasing product diversity, our...

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example...

We model firm pricing given consumers follow simple reservation price rules. Such reservation rules are rational when consumers are sufficiently impatient. The equilibrium exhibits price dispersion in pure strategies, with lower price firms earning higher profits. The range of price dispersion...

This paper analyses the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market with strategic traders. A trading structure (a partition of the set of traders into trading groups) is strongly stable if no coalition of traders can deviate and increase the utility of some of its members while making no...

In the theoretical literature, strong arguments have been provided in support of the efficiency defense in antitrust merger policy. One of the most often cited results is due to Williamson (1968) that shows how relatively small reduction in cost could offset the deadweight loss of a large price...

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy, as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects...

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements. Analogies with the cartel literature are found: under certain conditions on spillover values, outsiders benefit more than participants in R&D agreements. If cooperative spillovers are...

The aim of this paper is to test the predictions of Sutton's model of independent submarkets for the Italian retail banking industry. This industry, in fact, can be viewed as made of a large number of local markets corresponding to different geographical locations. In order to do that, I first...