After reviewing some of the basic preprocessins techniques for handling safety stocks and multilevel problems, we discusss a variety of aspects arising particularly in small and large bucket (time period) models such as stars-ups, changeovers, minimum batch sizes, choice of one or two set-ups...

This paper proposes a real option capacity expansion model for power generation with several technologies that differ in operation and investment costs. The economy is assumed perfectly competitive and the instantaneous payoff accruing from the generation system is the instantaneous welfare...

In this paper, we investigate dynamic price competition when firms strategically interact in two distinct but interrelated markets: a primary market and an aftermarket, where indirect network effects arise. We set up a differential game of two-dimensional price competition and we conclude that...

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat...

Firms' or industries' ranking in terms of environmental performance may be influenced by equilibrium and not only by ex ante technological characteristics. We adopt a natural definition of relative eco-efficiency between two industries operating withinthe same environmental constraint: the more...

Technological choices are multi-dimensional and thus one needs a multidimensional methodology to identify best available techniques. Moreover, in the presence of environmental externalities generated by productive activities, ?best? available techniques should be best from Society's point of...

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible...

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being...

Jackson and Watts [J. of Econ. Theory 71 (2002), 44-74] have examined the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise stability, p-pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable networks without requiring the "tree...