At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between countries adopting different systems of social insurance.

In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

This survey paper prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory covers the axiomatic foundation of decision making under uncertainty when conditional preferences are allowed to be state dependent, leading to an expected state-dependent utility representation.