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Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207637
At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207647
According to Chateauneuf (1996), we compare some inequality criteria. We investigate their properties and characteristics. Then, following the approach that links different levels of deprivation with alternative values of social welfare, we look for a functional that evaluates the well-being of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043136
This paper offers a rationale for the development of the barter industry in industrialized economies. It argues that, in a context of imperfect competition, barter represents a profitable and efficient system of exchange. Thanks to barter, even if already at the optimum, a monopolist can still...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043495
Inequalities in health and health care are caused by different factors. Measuring "unfair"inequalities implies that a distinction is introduced between causal variables leading toethically legitimate inequalities and causal variables leading to ethically illegitimateinequalities. An example of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043673
In this paper we exploit global analysis to explore welfare properties of a standard one-commodity GEI, under different notions of constrained Pareto optimality. In a unifying framework we revise and extend some of the leading results of the literature on incomplete markets and government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005633993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005633996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634038
In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634039
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634061