We consider the following stage game: a domestic government chooses an import quota, the a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different depending...

A recent phenomenon is the rapid spread of Antidumping (AD) laws mainly amongst developing countries (i.e. China, India, Mexico). Between 1980 and 2003 the number of countries in the world with an AD law more than doubled going from 36 to 97 countries. This proliferation of trade protection laws...

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements. Analogies with the cartel literature are found: under certain conditions on spillover values, outsiders benefit more than participants in R&D agreements. If cooperative spillovers are...

We analyze the relationship between Antidumping (AD) Protection and the productivity of EU domestic firms in import-competing industries. For this purpose we identify a panel of domestic firms between 1993 and 2003 that at some point during this period are affected by AD initiations. Using a...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna [89]. We show that a foreign pro- ducer would...

We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A...

We consider the following stage game : a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different...

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman [83] in the address model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competition drastically. In...

Strategic trade policy affects foreign-based firm's internationalization mode. In this paper, by endogenizing market structure and tariff policy, we claim that 'tariff jumping' is not enough to give a rationale to the existence of multinational enterprises, in absence of cost differentials and...