This paper investigates one of the most important financial issues arising from a secession or a country partioning, namely the sharing of the national public debt. Extending Dreze's distributive neutrality condition, we use the generational accounting technique and propose a dynamic...

In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another posibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively. We find that...

A country consists of two non-overlapping regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. If the facility is constructed, it generates a social value in the host region and has spillover effects in the rest of the country. The...

This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heterogeneous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces...

In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively.

This paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets sovereign national governments. Taxation of mobile capital and immobile labor in order to finance a public good generates inefficient fiscal competition. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a...

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads...

This paper provides a model of nonlinear income taxation in a context of international mobility. We consider two identical countries, in which each government chooses non-cooperatively redistributive taxes. It is shown that when skilled workers can move at low cost, the income taxation does not...

Inter-jurisdictional labor mobility when public funding of higher education is sub-federal leads to a disparity between the centralized output-maximizing allocation of resources to education and decentralized equilibria. We show that when local governments choose their level of spending on...

Tax competition within the EU is fiercer than in the rest of the OECD with tax rates falling rapidly. This paper analyzes tax responses of EU-15 countries to corporate tax changes in the EU-10 new member states as a function of their proximity to these new member states. The average corporate...