When environmental externalities are international — i.e. transfrontier — they most often are multilateral and embody public good characteristics. Improving upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria requires voluntary cooperation for which the game-theoretic core concept provides optimal...

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past...

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...

This paper proposes a dynamic model of international negotiations on transboundary pollution. This approach is characterized by a discrete time formulation ( at variance with the continuous model of Kaitale et al.(1995)) and by a suitable formulation of the local information assumption on cost...

While there have been some references in the literature to the potential role of the general decline in rainfall in sub-Saharan African nations on their poor growth performance relative to other developing countries, this avenue remains empirically unexplored. In this paper we use a new...

In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full cooperation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all countries...

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.