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Cores of games with positive externalities

CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic game. For a certain class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the conventional α- and β- cores. We argue that the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550191

Technology adoption under embodiment: a two-stage optimal control approach

BOUCEKKINE, RAOUF; SAGLAM, Cagri; VALLÉE, Thomas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

solve a benchmark problem without learning behavior. At the date of switching, the consumption level is shown to drop, as … induced growth advantage. In a second step, we introduce learning. The learning curve involves fixed costs and incentives to … wait as well. Adoption is shown to depend on the growth advantage of switching net of obsolescence and learning fixed costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043528

Learning differences in mixed common value auctions

GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2007

I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065347

Information at Equilibrium.

Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by strategies of other individuals: the elementary acts of other individuals at each state fo the world. At a Nash game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634162

Strongly rational sets for normal-form games

GRANDJEAN, Gilles; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550176

Financial Transfers to Sustain International Cooperation in the Climate Change Framework.

Germain, M.; Van Ypersele, J.P. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478927

Choquet Rationality.

Ghirardato, P.; Le Breton, M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478939

Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.

Bloch, F.; Rottier, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947

Two Examples of Strategic Equilibria in Approval Voting Games.

De Sinopoli, F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948

Efficiency in Correlated Equilibrium.

Ray, I. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478956