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Cores of games with positive externalities

CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic game. For a certain class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the conventional α- and β- cores. We argue that the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550191

Strongly rational sets for normal-form games

GRANDJEAN, Gilles; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550176

Learning differences in mixed common value auctions

GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2007

I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065347

Technology adoption under embodiment: a two-stage optimal control approach

BOUCEKKINE, RAOUF; SAGLAM, Cagri; VALLÉE, Thomas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

solve a benchmark problem without learning behavior. At the date of switching, the consumption level is shown to drop, as … induced growth advantage. In a second step, we introduce learning. The learning curve involves fixed costs and incentives to … wait as well. Adoption is shown to depend on the growth advantage of switching net of obsolescence and learning fixed costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043528

Information at Equilibrium.

Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by strategies of other individuals: the elementary acts of other individuals at each state fo the world. At a Nash game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634162

Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation

Tulkens, Henry - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

In a game with positive externalities, such as e.g. the standard environmental externality game used in the analysis of international environmental agreements, the solutions having the property of coalitional internal stability, when they exist, are compared in this paper with the solutions with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246306

Frontier-based performance analysis models for supply chain management; state of the art and research directions

AGRELL, Per; HATAMI-MARBINI, Adel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

Effective supply chain management relies on information integration and implementation of best practice techniques across the chain. Supply chains are examples of complex multi-stage systems with temporal and causal interrelations, operating multi-input and multi-output production and services...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610479

Prospects for Paris 2015: do major emitters want the same climate ?

BUCKLE, Simon; MUÛLS, Mirabelle; LEIB, Joerg; BRECHET, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

International negotiations have failed to achieve an ambitious outcome to limit climate risks. A Cournot outcome where countries determine their mitigation commitments in the full knowledge of those by others could be an important step. It would avoid a Stackelberg (leader-follower) outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752810

Trials and Errors: Plea Bargaining as a Learning Device.

Bortolotti, B. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779401

Mixed Refinements of Shapley's Saddles and Weak Tournaments.

Duggan, J.; Le Breton, M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

The authors investigates refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the firsy refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779419