This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium...

Polarization measures, that are used in examining the empirical relationship between ethnic divisions and violent conflict, heavily rely on mechanisms of group identification and often use somewhat arbitrary divisions of a society into ethnic groups. In this paper we construct two new measures...

We propose two axioms that introduce lower bounds into resource monotonicity requirements for rules for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. Suppose the amount to divide increases. The first axiom requires that two claimants whose lower bound changes equally experience an equal change...

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the general setting in which agents'claims may refer to different issues. We show that the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to two natural procedures yield the same outcomes.

In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...

This paper investigates the effect of ethnolinguistic conflict on redistribution. The analysis focuses on the conflict arising between "peripheral" minority groups and a dominant "center". We propose an index of linguistic conflict that (i) encompasses both diversity and polarization, and (ii)...

We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo....

I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round....