Profit maximization is not a well defined objective when markets are incomplete. Several criteria of investment choice have therefore been put forward in the literature, some of which crucially hinge upon aggregation of shareholders' preferences, as is the case with the criteria proposed by...

Profit maximization is not a well defined objective when markets are incomplete. Several criteria of investment choice have therefore been put forward in the literature, some of which crucially hinge upon aggregation of shareholders' preferences, as is the case with the criteria proposed by...

We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer anda retailer. We find that only three...

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A...

This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price...

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example...

I analyze a market where there is a homogeneous good, which quality is chosen, and therefore known, by a single producer. Consumers do not know the quality of the good but they use their acquaintances in order to obtain information about it. Information transmission exhibits decay and consumers...