We refine the notion of correlated equilibrium capturing the essence of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium concept. We define coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of a game as a pair consisting of a correlation device and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the correlation...

We analyze all the existing efficiency criteria of mechanism design literature in the context of correlated equilibrium: ex-post (classical) efficiency, strong interim efficiency, weak interim (incentive) efficiency, posterior (informational) efficiency. The natural criterion of interior...

We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations, and give an interpretation of the notion of mediated equilibrium. We find the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (088B) of an appropriately defined situation is nothing but the set of correlated...

If a solution (on a closed [exp.2] family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independence of irrelevant strategies (lIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor lIS as...