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Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

MISHRA, Debasis; PARKES, David C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this … the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a broad class of ascending price combinatorial auctions in which … efficiency for general valuations. We define two specific auctions in this class by generalizing two known auctions in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043169

On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study

HERRERO, Carmen; MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D.; PONTI, Giovanni - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042979

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

GRIMM, Veronika; KOVARIK, Jaromir; PONTI, Giovanni - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

This paper explores, theoretically and experimentally, a fixed-price mechanism bywhich, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. Ifdemand is uncertain, equilibrium consists in overstating true demand to alleviate theeffects of being rationed. Overstating is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008149

Auctions with Discrete Increments: a Structural Econometric Approach Based on Dominated Strategies.

Jouneau-Sion, F.; Torres, O. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

We propose a structural econometric evaluation for auctions with discrete increments. Although very common in practice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478908

Lobbying in Public Decision Making.

Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949

Information Advantage and Dominant Strategies in Second-Price Auctions.

Einy, E.; Haimanko, O.; Orzach, R.; Sela, A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478966

On the effects of banks’ equity ownership on credit markets : an antitrust perspective on the Glass-Steagall act

AMIR, Rabah; TROGE, Michael - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004

Recent U.S. legislation (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) allows commercial banks to enter merchant banking, i.e. hold equity in non-financial firms. A stylised auction-theoretic model is developed to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on the competition in bank loans. The main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043437

Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents

ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043652

Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods

ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008302

A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies.

Albano, G.-L.; Germano, F.; Lovo, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

sequential , the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669266