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Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

MISHRA, Debasis; PARKES, David C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this … the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a broad class of ascending price combinatorial auctions in which … efficiency for general valuations. We define two specific auctions in this class by generalizing two known auctions in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043169

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

GRIMM, Veronika; KOVARIK, Jaromir; PONTI, Giovanni - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

This paper explores, theoretically and experimentally, a fixed-price mechanism bywhich, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. Ifdemand is uncertain, equilibrium consists in overstating true demand to alleviate theeffects of being rationed. Overstating is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008149

On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study

HERRERO, Carmen; MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D.; PONTI, Giovanni - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042979

On the Strategic Origin of Brownian Motion in Finance.

De Meyer, B.; Moussa Saley, H. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

This paper is concerned with the stategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information. The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207634

Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods

ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008302

On the effects of banks’ equity ownership on credit markets : an antitrust perspective on the Glass-Steagall act

AMIR, Rabah; TROGE, Michael - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004

Recent U.S. legislation (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) allows commercial banks to enter merchant banking, i.e. hold equity in non-financial firms. A stylised auction-theoretic model is developed to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on the competition in bank loans. The main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043437

Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents

ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043652

The Limit-Price Mechanism.

Mertens, J-F - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996

We extend the "double auction" mechanism to a multi-commodity setup, or alternatively Shapley's "window"-mechanism to allow for limit orders.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005633985

Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information.

Einy, E.; Haimanko, O.; Orzach, R.; Sela, A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common …-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634042

Auctions with Discrete Increments: a Structural Econometric Approach Based on Dominated Strategies.

Jouneau-Sion, F.; Torres, O. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000

We propose a structural econometric evaluation for auctions with discrete increments. Although very common in practice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478908