This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

This article presents an analysis of the behavior of countries defining their climate policies in an uncertain context. The analysis is made using the S-CWS model, a stochastic version of an integrated assessment growth model. The model includes a stochastic definition of the climate sensitivity...

Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process that...

We study how a behavior (an idea, buying a product, having a disease, adopting a cultural fad or a technology) spreads among agents in an a social network that exhibits segregation or homophily (the tendency of agents to associate with others similar to themselves). Individuals are distinguished...

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

We investigate the effects of forward looking behavior in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generation model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking in consideration both the installed base and the expected base. The latter element is the distinctive feature of...

This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for complete information games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.

We consider a dynamic two-country, two-commodity model in which each country specializes in the production of one commodity and trades with the other to consume both goods. The amount of capital used for production in one country generates externalities in the production of the other. This is...

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past...