In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of...

The literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics. This methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions, and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities....

We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with multiple alternatives, in which voters have common interests. Voters’ preferences depend on an unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature...

A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against...

It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking contest when the contest success function parameter is greater than two. We analyze the contest using the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies, which is a generalization of the Nash...

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizencandidate model of...

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...