We consider a continuous-time variant of the classical Economic Lot-Sizing (ELS) problem. In this model, the setup cost is a continuous function with lower bound $K_min 0$, the demand and holding costs are integrable functions of time and the replenishment decisions are not restricted to be...

This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash...

We show that the logic of Arrow's theorem of the deductible, i.e. that it is optimal to focus insurance coverage on the states with largest expenditures, remains at work in a model with ex post moral hazard. The optimal insurance contract takes the form of a system of "implicit deductibles",...

Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with high tax regions. However, with heterogeneous regions, revenue sharing involves net transfers across regions and creates a 'moral-hazard' problem that is, regions may want to invest less in market...

A partly heuristic attempt at exploring long-run policies aimed at a second-best compromise between ex ante risk-sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency. Wage subsidies for low-skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated, together with improved risk sharing between...

This note presents a modest extension of the very useful "theorem of the deductible" (Arrow, American Economic Review, 1963). The extension concerns ex post moral hazard in medical insurance. Under full insurance above a deductible, the marginal cost of treatment to the insured is zero,...

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources...

In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to finance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the borrower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss efficiency issues in competitive economies...

This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in a society where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment. If parents' investments in children are publicly observable, pension benefits must be linked positively to the the level...

This paper investigates the relation between risk and the degree of financial intermediation in a model with moral hazard. Entrepreneurs can simultaneously get credit from two type of competing institutions:"financial intermediairies" and "local lenders". The former are competitive firms issuing...