This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary...

We axiomatize the inner core in a similar way as the one proposed by Aumann (1985)in order to characterize the NTU value.

In the problems of choosing "aspirations" for coalitional games,we study two axioms, "MW-consistency" and "converse MW-consistency ", introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1994). We mainly consider two domains: thedomain of all NTU games and the domain of all TU games.

We revisit and extend previous theoretical work on internationalization decisions by firms which are imperfectly informed on the state of the demand in the market into which they are planning to export or enter through foreign direct investment (FDI). The latter is a costly strategy mitigating...

International negotiations have failed to achieve an ambitious outcome to limit climate risks. A Cournot outcome where countries determine their mitigation commitments in the full knowledge of those by others could be an important step. It would avoid a Stackelberg (leader-follower) outcome...