We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner's viewpoint. We show that the dynamical inefficiency of competitive...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. Each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can voluntarily contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution...

This paper deals with the effect of conjectures in a strategic setting.To do this it focuses on the so-called Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE).According to this concept, each agent chooses his most favorable action taking into account that rival strategies are a conjectured function of...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of average efficiency of depollution technology. If on the contrary, the...

In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...

We examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We extend the existing literature by endogenizing the reaction of the IEAs members to a deviation by a member or a group of members. We assume that when a country contemplates exiting or joining an agreement, it takes...

The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.