This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heterogeneous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces...

In this paper we set up a symmetric two-country model with trade costs and international ownership to study the transfer pricing decisions by two multinationals operating in markets with Cournot competition. We let governments choose both the corporate profit tax rate and the level of...

This paper proposes a dynamic model of international negotiations on transboundary pollution. This approach is characterized by a discrete time formulation ( at variance with the continuous model of Kaitale et al.(1995)) and by a suitable formulation of the local information assumption on cost...

In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where...

The paper shows that global pollution need not rise under free trade in goods and/or emissions even in the complete absence of income effects. Differences in environmental concerns across the countries lead to differences in the pollution-intensity of production and thus generate the possibility...

Governments set numerous norms to protect consumers. Two countries may achieve the same level of protection of their consumers through different specifications. The adaptation costs induced by these differences create barriers to trade. The principle of mutual recognition addresses the problem...

We consider the following stage game : a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different...

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary...