We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer anda retailer. We find that only three...

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectlycomp etitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum...

We develop a theoretical model of retail competition that include two sources of quality, one inherently linked to brand characteristics and the other linked to the retailer level of service. We then measure their contribution in explaining the observed price differentials for a sample of U.K....

This contribution investigates the effictiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and...

This contribution investigates the effectiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and...

We analyze a model of a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions. These two locations differ for the market size or for the distribution of the willingness to pay for quality of their consumers. Firms sequentially choose to settle in one region and then simultaneously compete in...