We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Bayesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partitions. At each...

The present paper analyses existence and structure of revealing equilibria of a game which models the asset-trading interaction between a risk-neutral informed price-making agent and an uninformed one. The trade-off in the problem faced by the uninformed turns out to be between losing smaller...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Byesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partition.

In this paper robustness properties are studied for kernel density estimators. A plug-in and least squares cross-validation bandwidth selector are considered. In an asymptotic analysis and in a simulation study it is shown that the robustness of kernel density estimates depends strongly on the...

In this paper robustness properties are studied for kernel density estimators. A plug-in and least squares cross-validation bandwidth selector are considered. In an asymptotic analysis and in a simulation study it is shown that the robustness of kernel density estimates depends strongly on the...

Winemaking is a highly complex technology. It needs inputs over which there is no control (good weather conditions), initial endowments which can hardly be modified (soil, exposure of the slopes), inputs which take 20 to 30 years before producing good quality outputs (vines), manual operations...

Increasing dispersion in regression analysis means that with positive changes of the explanatory variable the residual variance increases. Motivated by theoretical questions in stability of demand systems we consider the question of increasing dispersion in a nonparameteric way. It amounts to...

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information, Nash-Walras equilibria...

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

I develop a model of stochastic costly signaling in the presence of exogenous imperfect information, and study whether equilibrium signaling decreases ('information substitutes') or increases ('information complements') if the accuracy of exogenous information increases. A stochastic pure costly...