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Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its break-up into smaller countries leads to aggregate utility loss. We show that in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042827

The stability threshold and two facets of polarization

HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

In this paper we introduce the stability threshold that quantifies the minimal returns to size sufficient to prevent credible secession threats by regions of the country. Severity of internal tension has been linked to degree of polarization of citizens' preferences and characteristics. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065281

Nash-Walras equilibria

GHOSAL, Sayantan; POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1995

At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008241

Nash - Walras Equilibria.

Ghosal, S; Polemarchakis, H - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1995

At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207647

Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures.

Dutta, B.; Jackson, M.O.; Le Breton, M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

This paper studies the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669337

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278

Lobbying in Public Decision Making.

Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949

Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare

HINDRIKS, Jean; LOCKWOOD, Ben - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043539

Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.

Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077

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