When "n" individuals satisfy the axioms of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory and these individuals' probabilities or/and utilities are sufficiently diverse, it is impossible to aggregate the individuals' preferences into a (n+1)-preference which is both Paretian and in agreement with SEU...

At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

Profit maximization is not a well defined objective when markets are incomplete. Several criteria of investment choice have therefore been put forward in the literature, some of which crucially hinge upon aggregation of shareholders' preferences, as is the case with the criteria proposed by...

At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the...

Profit maximization is not a well defined objective when markets are incomplete. Several criteria of investment choice have therefore been put forward in the literature, some of which crucially hinge upon aggregation of shareholders' preferences, as is the case with the criteria proposed by...

This paper examines a model of multi-jurisdiction formation where individuals' characteristics are uniformly distributed over a finite interval. Every jurisdiction locates a public facility and distributes its cost equally among the residents. We consider two notions of stability: Nash...

This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heterogeneous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces...

In this paper we introduce the stability threshold that quantifies the minimal returns to size sufficient to prevent credible secession threats by regions of the country. Severity of internal tension has been linked to degree of polarization of citizens' preferences and characteristics. We show...

We consider a linguistically diversified society that has to select a set of languages to be used for official purposes. We examine the notion of language disenfranchisement that is created when one or more languages fail to be included in the list of the official ones, implying that some...