In a context of asymmetry of information between firms' owners and their managers, we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in an oligopoly industry. Moreover, we consider that the government has the possibilityto intervene in the market by nationalizing an incumbent...

We consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones, and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized. In the short run, privatization is harmful because prices rise: the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost. In the long run, privatization leads to further...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency due to...

We consider a market in which a public firm completes against private ones, and ask what happens when the public firms is privatized. In the short run, privatization is harmful because prices rise: the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost. In the long run, privatization, leads to further...

The basic idea of crowdfunding is to raise external finance from a large audience (the “crowd”), where each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. The paper develops a model that associates crowdfunding with pre-ordering and...

The asset market is incomplete. Fix-price equilibria exist. Price regulation Pareto improves on a competitive allocation. Prices in competitive markets may fail to attain equilibrium. The theory of general competitive equilibrium does not account for the adjustment of prices; empirical evidence...

We study a model in which heterogenous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of...

When n individuals satisfy the axioms of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory and these individuals' probabilities or/and utilities are sufficiently diverse, it is impossible to aggregate the individuals' preferences into a (n + 1)-preference which is both Paretian and in agreement with SEU...

Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem has often been dismissed as being irrelevant to utilitarianism, and thus void of ethical content. Some of these objections can be met by reformulating Harsanyi’s theorem in the multi-profile context of Social Welfare Functionals theory. The present paper aims...