This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same jurisdiction. The resulting equilibrium is unique and symmetric but differs according to preferences, technologies and public policy. The budget for university finance is exogenously given and...

This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same juridiction. The resulting equilibrium is unique and symmetric but differs according to preferences, technologies and public policy. The bydget for university finance is exogenously givenand...

This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price...

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example...

I analyze a market where there is a homogeneous good, which quality is chosen, and therefore known, by a single producer. Consumers do not know the quality of the good but they use their acquaintances in order to obtain information about it. Information transmission exhibits decay and consumers...

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy, as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects...

Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one- dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi- characteristics space. In the location game with n characteristics, firms choose to...

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant.