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It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking contest when the contest success function parameter is greater than two. We analyze the contest using the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies, which is a generalization of the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752806
A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662671
In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008260
This survey paper prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory covers the axiomatic foundation of decision making under uncertainty when conditional preferences are allowed to be state dependent, leading to an expected state-dependent utility representation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634106
This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478939
In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948
In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478962
We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478966
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972
We consider a continuous-time variant of the classical Economic Lot-Sizing (ELS) problem. In this model, the setup cost is a continuous function with lower bound $K_min 0$, the demand and holding costs are integrable functions of time and the replenishment decisions are not restricted to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094057