We use a large data set of deductible choices in auto insurance contracts to estimate the distribution of risk preferences in our sample. To do so, we develop a structural econometric model, which accounts for adverse selection by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (probability...

A major shortcoming of the growing empirical work on asymmetric information is the inability to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection. Abbring et. al. (2003) point out that dynamic insurance data can help here, by asking whether consumers have fewer claims when they are at a...

The presence of a heavy truck on the road can impose an externality if accidents occur that would not have otherwise. We find each additional truck on the road increases the risk of a truck accident--but also, at an even higher rate, the risk of a car-on-car collision. Our estimates imply two...

This study quantifies the importance of private information, separates the extent to which the positive correlation between the accident probability and insurance coverage reflects adverse selection and moral hazard, and analyzes market segmentation on objective accident risk. We use data we...

Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations. Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others to the risk of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however, and have largely...