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Gibbons, Robert - 1996

This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives. I then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473133

The boundary of the firm in a model of trade within a hierarchy

Levy, Nadav (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

-world multidivisional firms: Operative decisions are in the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the … performance of their units; Managers' decisions are subject to approval and intervention by the top management of the firm; and … managers are better informed regarding the affairs of their divisions than their superiors in the firm's hierarchy. In this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002200406

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2000

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137

Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do

Bertrand, Marianne - 2000

We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471166

Does Product Market Competition Reduce Agency Costs?

Jagannathan, Ravi - 2000

The folk wisdom is that competition reduces agency costs. We provide indirect empirical support for this view. We argue that the temptation to retain cash and engage in less productive activities is more severe for firms in less competitive industries. Hence an unanticipated increase in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471296

Empire-Builders and Shirkers : Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999

shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471449

Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Eaton, Jonathan - 1981

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478336

The Allocation of Authority in Organizations : A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats

Bandiera, Oriana - 2020

We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479257