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Gibbons, Robert - 1996

This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives. I then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473133

The boundary of the firm in a model of trade within a hierarchy

Levy, Nadav (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

-world multidivisional firms: Operative decisions are in the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the … performance of their units; Managers' decisions are subject to approval and intervention by the top management of the firm; and … managers are better informed regarding the affairs of their divisions than their superiors in the firm's hierarchy. In this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002200406

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2000

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137

Taxes, High-Income Executives, and the Perils of Revenue Estimation in the New Economy

Goolsbee, Austan - 2000

This paper attempts to help explain the unforecasted, excess' personal income tax revenues of the last several years. Using panel data on executive compensation in the 1990s, it argues that because the gains on most stock options are treated as ordinary income for tax purposes, rising stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471145

The Taxation of Executive Compensation

Hall, Brian J. - 2000

Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471173

Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options

Hall, Brian J. - 2000

Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471227

Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450

Valuing the Reload Features of Executive Stock Options

Huddart, Steven - 1999

Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471780

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

The Allocation of Authority in Organizations : A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats

Bandiera, Oriana - 2020

We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479257