Players from two populations, predictors and predictees, are randomly matched in a game--theoretic version of Newcomb's Problem. Predictors are able to predict the predictees' choices by observing their type. There are two types of predictees, those who take their predictability into account by...

The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices...

The paper defines "order" as constraints that are designed or spontaneously evolved to constrain human action sets in order to stabilze expectations, and therefore enhance coordination of interactive behavior. A simple model of evolutionary game theory is used to explain the evolution of...

Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall...