Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We analyze the nature of optimal contracts in a dynamic model of repeated (and persistent) adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular we consider the case of surgeons who diagnose patients and then decide whether to perform an operation, and if so, whether to exert a costly but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013000
This paper presents an overlapping generations model to explain why humans live in families rather than in other pair groupings. Since most non-human species are not familial, something special must be behind the family. It is shown that the two necessary features that explain the origin of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562715
In many tournaments investments are made over time and conducting a review only once at the end, or also at points midway through, is a strategic decision of the tournament designer. If the latter is chosen, then a rule according to which the results of the different reviews are aggregated into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459375
This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of conditional probability and its use. The ideas are then applied to resolve a conceptual puzzle related to Savage's "Sure-Thing Principle."
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585330
We provide a new characterization of implementability of reduced form mechanisms in terms of straightforward second-order stochastic dominance. In addition, we present a simple proof of Matthews' (1984) conjecture, proved by Border (1991), on implementability.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391680
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We also provide a characterization of revenue-maximizing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593232
We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752841