Similar Search Results

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

BOCHET, Olivier; GORDON, Sidartha - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2008

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617066

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

FLEURBAEY, Marc; SPRUMONT, Yves - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2006

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617085

The Rationality of Revolution.

Dudley, L. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1996

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616522

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games.

Bossert, W.; Derks, J.; Peters, H. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2001

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729546

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: An Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

SPRUMONT, Yves; MANIQUET, François - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2006

partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617048

Social Choice: Recent Developments

BOSSERT, Walter; WEYMARK, J.A. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2006

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617079

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under … fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget …-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671538

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity.

Bossert, W.; Sprumont, Y.; Suzumura, K. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2001

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationship between the different notions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545561

Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

Sprumont, Y. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1996

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545562

House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883525