Showing 1 - 10 of 13
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617024
are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617066
In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617079
A public decision model specifies a fixed set of alternatives A, a variable population, and a fixed set of admissible preferences over A, common to all agents. We study the implications, for any social choice function, of the principle of solidarity, in the class of all such models. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617080
satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671568
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122151
individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the -core is non-empty, the allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163383
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616518
We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A priority structure for which these two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927914
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883525