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A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or groups of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729570
Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show … estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616515
This short paper employs individual voting records of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617036
engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617062
different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change, an agenda … by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the … superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617069
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preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927897
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927904
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927921