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Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization?

Poitevin, M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2000

based on private information and incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729594

Incentives in Multi-Period Regulation and Procurement : A Graphical Analysis.

Dionne, G.; Fluet, C. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353097

Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory.

Beaudry, P.; Poitevin, M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729610

A Model of Dynamic Liquidity Contracts

öZGÜR, Onur - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2011

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when … can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature … characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927924

Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle

AMBEC, Stefan; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2011

We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616520

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2005

The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671545

Specialization and Human Capital in Search Equilibrium

MUKOYAMA, Toshihiko; ŞAHIN, Ayşegül - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2005

This paper constructs a general equilibrium search-matching model with heterogeneous workers. Workers choose whether to invest in general human capital or specific human capital when they enter the labor market. We analyze how unemployment benefits affect the choice of the type of human capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671563

Repeated Moral Hazard with Persistence

MUKOYAMA, Toshihiko; SAHIN, Aysegül - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2004

conveys information about his past actions. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005346032

Policy Making with Reputation Concerns

FU, Qiang; LI, Ming - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

We study the policy choice of an incumbent politician who is concerned with the public's perception of his capability. The politician decides whether to maintain the status quo or to conduct a risky reform. The success of the reform critically depends on the ability of the politician in oce,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617039

Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis

BOYER, Marcel; PORRINI, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617051

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