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EHLERS, Lars; WESTKAMP, Alexander - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2011

, matching. A priority structure for which these two requirements are compatible is called solvable. For the general class of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927914

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671538

(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2012

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616511

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927904

Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited

EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the -core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163383

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

EHLERS, Lars; MASSÓ, Jordi - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2007

We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry … other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for … stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617041

Manipulation via Capacities Revisited

EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2009

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no …. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617057

Product Filters, Acyclicity and Suzumura Consistency

BOSSERT, Walter; SUZUMURA, Kotaro - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

In a seminal contribution, Hansson (1976) demonstrates that the collection of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity as the coherence property imposed on a social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616519

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

BOCHET, Olivier; GORDON, Sidartha - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2008

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617066