We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...

We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A priority structure for which these two...

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and...

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via...

Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation for controlled school choice programs. We develop a natural notion of...

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the -core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their...

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a...