In contrast to previous studies on cross-group comparisons of conditional cooperation, this study keeps cross- and within-country dimensions constant. The results reveal significantly different cooperation behavior between social groups in the same location.<p>

Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechansism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark...

We show that peer sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods experiments more in unequally endowed groups than in equally endowed groups. Punishment results in a redistribution of wealth from high to low endowment players within groups. <p>

We analyse the effects of migration on the production of public goods, income taxes, and on the welfare of residents in the sending and in the receiving country. Migration is based on income differences between countries. Different alternative scenarios are considered. In the first, we assume...

We compare voluntary contributions to a public good in a symmetric setting to those in a weakly and a strongly asymmetric setting, where the players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that the group-contribution levels are not significantly different between the symmetric...

This paper examines how and why people migrate between two re- gions with asymmetric size. The agglomeration force comes from the scale economies in the provision of local public goods, whereas the disper- sion force comes from congestion in consumption of public goods. Public goods considered...

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures, whereas the policy choices of the rest of the world are taken as given. Applying the...

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of...

This text (Keser) is a survey and a discussion of experimental studies on cooperation in public goods experiments. It is followed by a comment (Montmarquette) suggesting some economic applications from these experimental studies. Ce texte (Keser) présente une revue et une discussion des écrits...